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Abstract
This paper explores the ways in which national identities shape 
attitudes towards differentiated integration in two old member states, 
one relatively new member state and one candidate country – namely 
France, Germany, the Czech Republic and Turkey. It also observes 
how the impact of differentiated integration on European identity is 
perceived in these given countries in terms of preserving European 
identity (deepening), the dilution of European identity (disintegration) 
and the territorial/geographic limits of European identity (widening). 
By employing primary research and discourse analysis, the study finds 
that there is no single and monolithic national identity which produces 
a uniform attitude towards differentiated integration in member and 
candidate states, but rather that competing domestic national identity 
narratives produce differing attitudes within a state on differentiated 
integration. These national identity narratives can translate into starkly 
different policy positions concerning the policy area that is subject to 
differentiated integration, as well as on how differentiation is expected to 
impact the future of European integration and European identity.
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Introduction
The literature on European integration has produced a plethora of works exploring the 
relationship between national and European identity. Some of these studies have focused 
on how perceptions of national/European identity play a role in citizens’ attitudes towards 
European integration (Díez Medrano 2003, Fuchs and Klingemann 2011), while others have 
examined the relationship between nation-state identities and member state positions on 
European integration (Larsen 1997) or the impact of national identities on member states’ 
positions on selected EU policies such as enlargement (Aydın-Düzgit 2012). In a similar 
vein, the last decade has seen a proliferation of studies on differentiated integration in the 
EU, be it in the context of the politics of differentiated integration (Dyson and Sepos 2010), 
its institutional design (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016), implications for democracy 
and legitimacy in the EU (Fossum 2015), its legal repercussions (Kroll and Leuffen 2015, 
Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014) and its feasibility, desirability and consequences in 
select policy areas (Howorth 2019, Keleman 2019, Lavenex 2015).
Despite the growth of research in both streams, there has been relatively little interaction 
between the literature on national/European identity and that of differentiated 
integration. In the rare cases where the two met, identity has either been treated as an 
epiphenomenal variable with little impact on member states’ positions on differentiated 
integration; or as a significant variable with an overall but undifferentiated impact on the 
member state’s overall position on differentiation. In cases where identity was found to 
have an effect (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2017), it was argued that those member 
states with “exclusive national identities” that are generally negatively oriented towards 
multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism tended to be more in favour of differentiated 
integration (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2017). Yet, these studies are conceptually 
inspired by rational-choice theories in which identity is theorised as a more or less fixed 
independent variable affecting a state’s attitudes towards differentiated integration.
Different to these works, we employ interpretivist lenses which theorise identity as 
a discursive and a relational phenomenon. Identity is discursive in the sense that it is 
not fixed or inherent to any entity but is constructed through discourse. Thus identities 
“emerge out of a process of representation through which individuals […] describe to 
themselves and others the world in which they live” (Weldes et al. 1999: 14) and in line with 
this discursive nature, they remain unstable and fragmented. We conceptualise identity 
as relational in the sense that the identity of any Self only acquires meaning through 
its relation to Other(s). Hence identity is unthinkable without its “constitutive outside” 
(Butler 1993), without its Other(s). Regardless of how minimal the differences tend to be, 
they are still central in the discursive construction of the identity of the Self (Neumann 
1999: 35). From an interpretivist perspective in which social reality is conceptualised as 
discursively constructed, discourses, including those on identity, do not “cause” but that 
they can “enable” certain actions by “set[ting] limits to what is possible to be articulated” 
(Diez 1999: 611).
Applied to the case of national and European identities, this conceptual framework posits 
that both national and European identities are discursively constructed. Furthermore, as 
the vast literature on European identity have aptly demonstrated, European identities are 
heavily contingent on the ways in which national identities are discursively articulated 
(Marcussen et al. 1999, Larsen 1997, Risse 2010, Díez Medrano 2003, Aydın-Düzgit 
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2012). In other words, there exists no fixed understanding of European identity that is 
independent from the way in which national identities are expressed by the national 
political actors in the EU member states and by way of extension, in the candidate 
countries. Hence European identities in EU member and candidate states come in 
national colours and as such, can in turn have an enabling/disabling impact on the 
political positions taken in these countries towards various aspects of European 
integration.
In this paper, our goal is to identify the ways in which national identities that 
are discursively articulated with reference to Europe shape attitudes towards 
differentiated integration by enabling/disabling proposed policy options in two old 
member states, one relatively new member state and one candidate country – 
namely France, Germany, the Czech Republic and Turkey. In turn, we also aim to 
observe how the impact of differentiated integration on European identity articulated 
in national colours is perceived in these given countries in terms of preserving 
European identity (deepening), the dilution of European identity (disintegration) and 
the territorial/geographic limits of European identity (widening).
We adhere to EU IDEA’s common definition of differentiated integration as “a process 
of integration in which the Member States[, potentially joined by non-EU members,] 
opt to move forward at different speeds and/or towards different objectives, in 
contrast to the notion of a monolithic bloc of states pursuing identical objectives 
at a single speed” (European Commission 1997: 28). We argue in this paper that 
there is no single and monolithic national identity which produces a uniform attitude 
towards differentiated integration in member and candidate states, but rather that 
competing domestic national identity narratives produce differing attitudes within a 
state on differentiated integration. Furthermore, we also argue that these national 
identity narratives can translate into starkly different policy positions concerning the 
policy area which is subject to differentiated integration. In other words, one should 
not expect a country, or a political group within a state, to have a uniform position 
on differentiated integration as a whole, but that attitudes may differ depending on 
the policy area which is being subject to differentiated integration at the European 
Union level.
In doing that, we focus on the respective political discourses in the four selected 
states on four distinct events of political differentiation in the EU. The events that are 
selected are the signing of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
the Economic and Monetary Union (fiscal compact) in March 2012, the EU migration 
crisis in November 2015, the Brexit referendum in June 2016 and the establishment 
of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the area of security and defence 
policy in December 2017. These four cases were selected on the grounds that they 
are all relatively recent events which sparked considerable national and EU-wide 
debates on differentiated integration, and because they have led to varied outcomes 
regarding differentiation in the EU: two cases where concrete outcomes of internal 
differentiation were reached (fiscal compact and PESCO); one where attempts for 
internal differentiation failed and led instead to international cooperation with a 
third (candidate) country outside the EU legal framework (EU–Turkey statement on 
migration); and one where internal differentiation did not suffice to keep a country 
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(Britain) as a member and led in turn to further debates on the future of both internal 
and external differentiated integration in the context of an EU without the UK as well 
as the UK’s future mode of engagement with the EU.
The texts that are subject to analysis consist of national parliamentary debates; 
statements by officials from the government and the main opposition; and editorials 
published in the main newspapers which represent the centre-left and the centre-
right of the political spectrum in each selected state. Hence our analysis relies on 
original data drawn from the representation of these events in the discourses of the 
political actors and key media representatives. In approaching the texts, we focus in 
particular on a) how attitudes towards specific instances of differentiated integration 
are discursively justified by these actors in the selected states with reference to their 
articulated visions of Europe, including the perceived impact of such differentiation 
on preserving (deepening), dilution of (disintegration) and territorial/geographic 
limits of (widening) European identity; as well as b) the ways in which these visions 
relate to various national identity representations which have been identified in the 
extensive literature on national identities in Europe and beyond (see, among others, 
Wodak 2004, Larsen 1997, Marcussen et al. 1999). The timeline of the analysis covers 
three months prior to and three months (six months for the migration crisis) after 
the selected event of differentiated integration. This is mainly because our discursive 
approach requires us to focus on a period in which discursive articulations on the 
select events were intense and the data that is available is considerable, yet also 
manageable to conduct an in-depth discursive analysis.
In terms of methodology, we conduct a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the texts 
under scrutiny. CDA is a method of discourse analysis which focuses on the study 
of the relations between discourse and social and cultural developments in different 
social domains. It views discursive practices as an important form of social practice 
that contributes to the constitution of the social world, including social identities 
and social relations (Wodak and Meyer 2016). In this deliverable, we adhere to the 
discourse-historical strand of CDA which takes a longer and thus historical view of 
discourses and is particularly utilised in studying demarcations of identity in texts. 
This approach entails a closer look at the discursive strategies used in texts to define 
the Self in relation to Other(s). For the purposes of this study, we focus particularly on 
two discursive strategies in texts, namely predication and argumentation (Reisigl and 
Wodak 2001). While a focus on predication will help us in responding to the question 
of how the national Selves in relation to Europe/EU are named and referred to in the 
texts, a closer look at argumentation strategies will reveal the central arguments 
and argumentation schemes that are used in justifying, legitimising and naturalising 
representations of actors and the selected events in discourse.
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1. France and differentiated integration: 
Centrality of the French self in a 
differentiated Europe
In the case of France, national identity perceptions seem to be closely intertwined 
with how differentiated integration is discussed in all policy areas under analysis. 
Regardless of the policy in question, the French debate centres almost always on 
the centrality of the French Self and its Republican values, seen as central to the 
healthy functioning of Europe. In turn, the success of European integration is seen 
as key to maintaining and increasing France’s weight on the global stage. With 
the exception of the migration crisis, differentiation is generally welcome as long 
as France remains at the core of the process. In the case of PESCO and the fiscal 
compact, differentiation is expected to deepen the sense of Europe and European 
identity, whereas the opposite, hence disintegration, is feared with Brexit and the 
migration crisis. While there are often considerable disagreements between different 
political actors on the policy content of differentiation based on their political and 
ideological stances, we observe that differentiation as a general component of 
European integration is widely accepted and preferred in the French context.
The following subsections will discuss how each selected case of differentiation, 
presented in temporal order, has been discursively represented by French policy 
makers and in the media discourse, in relation to national identity narratives and 
articulations of Europe.
1.1 Fiscal Compact
The fiscal compact was predominantly defended by French government 
representatives of the time as the key means to help Europe deal with the financial 
crisis and bring France to the centre of the global stage. France is also accorded a 
historical responsibility to bring Europe out of its financial impasse. In his opening 
remarks to the French Parliament’s debate on the fiscal compact, Jean Leonetti, 
Minister of European Affairs from the UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire), 
articulates this:
For centuries, France is a major actor in the world. Our voice counts because 
we defend universal values. How can France, inheritor of the French 
Revolution and a founding state of the European Union succumb to calls 
for de-globalisation? The world is not de-globalising. We will either choose 
to be a part of it or withdraw. We have chosen action. […] We have chosen 
responsibility which rests on solidarity and discipline. […] The treaties which 
will be put to your vote are those that will help make France and Europe grow. 
Those who refuse these steps are running the risk of putting Europe and 
France in danger. (Assemblée Nationale 2012: 1321-22)
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The excerpt above predicates France as a “major [global] actor” thanks to its defender 
role of “universal values” which derives from its national history and is thus also 
equated with French values. This national standing bestows a certain responsibility of 
the part of Europe to be proactive in a situation where the fates of France and Europe 
are intertwined – and thus justifies its support for the fiscal compact. There is ample 
secondary literature on the ways in which “Europe” plays a key role in conceptions of 
the French “Self”. It has widely been argued that a fusion was constructed between 
the concept of the “French nation” and “Europe”, primarily during the Presidency of 
Mitterrand in the face of the French political and economic decline of the 1980s 
(Larsen 1997: 89), which was later to be adopted by the French right in defining the 
new role of France in the world after the end of the Cold War. In this discursive fusion, 
Europe is created as a larger France which takes on the traditional tasks and ideals 
of France, namely its “mission civilisatrice”, because France has become too small 
to project its universal values itself (Wæver 2005: 44). Waever further highlights that 
this constructs “Europe” not only as a scene on which France acts in a central position 
as “Europe’s vanguard, but also as an entity that is ‘French in its form’” (Aydın-Düzgit 
2012: 14).
“Europe” as a replication of the French model at a higher level implies, thus, that 
it should have “clear borders” and a “hard capable core” standing strong externally 
as more than “a free trade zone”, and having the “political capacity to act” (Larsen 
1997: 89, 104). This is necessary for French interests to be guarded and promoted 
to prevent France from becoming an “ordinary republic” (Larsen 1997: 112). Yet, in 
most cases, this also paves the way for the welcoming of differentiated integration 
with a strong core, so long as this will serve to strengthen France and the European 
project. Hence Alex Poniatowski, president of the foreign affairs commission from 
the UMP, argues in the same debate that the Eurocrisis and the ensuing fiscal 
compact demonstrate the need for Europe to “create strong cores among those 
states that wish to take new steps in integration” and “progress at different speeds” 
which could in turn deliver urgent and effective European responses to crises. Hence 
differentiation through the fiscal compact is perceived in the French discourse as 
a way of deepening Europe and European identity, in order to save the project from 
disintegration in the face of crises.
This enthusiasm for differentiation with a strong core does not seem to be shared 
by the sovereigntist-Gaullist wing of the French centre-right, for which the “sovereign” 
right of the nation to make the budget cannot be transferred from national parliaments 
onto the European level.1 The analysis also suggests that although the content of 
the fiscal compact is heavily criticised by the French left, and in particular the far 
left, these segments do not attack these initiatives for promoting differentiation, but 
mainly for advancing austerity measures. Hence both sides question and/or reject 
the policy content rather than differentiation itself. Nonetheless, even when criticising 
the compact for its punitive nature, the representatives of the far left in particular 
draw from historical analogies with the French national past such as the French 
Revolution and draw attention to how austerity by abandoning solidarity betrays its 
1 See, for instance, contributions by Jacques Myard (LR) and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (DLF) in 
Assemblée Nationale (2012).
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legacy and the true French/European Self.2
1.2 Migration crisis
It is in debates over the migration crisis and the ensuing EU–Turkey migration 
statement that French and European identities are most explicitly invoked in the 
French case. The French prime minister, Manuel Valls, in his address to the French 
national assembly, underlines that the refugee crisis
provides an opportunity for us [the French] to reveal who we are: a strong 
and generous nation, a nation which has always guided the world and its 
people towards emancipation, liberty, law, dignity and culture, a nation which 
welcomes the oppressed while remaining attached to its values: liberty, 
equality, fraternity and secularism. (Assemblée Nationale 2015: 7300)
Similar to the excerpt above, the French founding values and history, articulated as 
such, figure prominently as the main drivers of the French response to the refugee 
crisis. The deictic “we” used interchangeably for the French nation is associated with 
a positive representation of the French Self around history (sometimes with reference 
to the French history of migration) and founding values of the Republic. The response 
to the crisis will hence be shaped by French identity defined around these values as 
well as (re)affirming such identity through the enactment of the right policies. Europe 
enters into the debates in terms of what shape these policies must take, often in the 
form of a call for European solidarity. Nonetheless, different than the other policy 
areas examined, differentiation is shunned by all political actors when the issue 
concerns migration. While the suggested policy content may differ across different 
political party groups, nearly all seem to be united on the need for the inclusion of all 
European countries, including the establishment of a common migration and asylum 
policy, in tackling the refugee crisis. In the same speech, Valls refers to Schengen as 
an “essential element of European identity” and makes a plea for “a more, and not 
a less Europe” in managing the crisis.3 Others refer to this particular instance as an 
“opportunity to build a united and stronger Europe”4 and/or a test case of “French 
and European values”5 (used often interchangeably). Hence the perceived impact 
of differentiation regarding migration on European identity is overwhelmingly one of 
dilution, hence disintegration, of European solidarity and identity.
The data, however, suggests that the EU–Turkey statement agreed on 18 March 
2016 between the EU member states and Turkey to stop irregular migration flows 
from Turkey to the EU, delivers a fatal blow to the solidarity rhetoric, with all but the 
government representatives from the Socialist party condemning it by referring to 
2 See, for instance, contributions by Jean-Pierre Brard (PCF) and Jean-Paul Lecoq (PCF) in the 
above debate.
3 See also contributions by Phillipe Vigier (UDI) and Valerie Pecresse (LR) in Assemblée Nationale 
(2015).
4 See, for instance, contributions by Phillipe Vigier (UDI), Sergio Coronado (PE), Jeanine Dubie (MR), 
Andre Chassaigne (PCF), Bruno Le Roux (PS) and Danielle Auroi (PS).
5 See contributions by Elisabeth Guigou (PS) and Daniella Auroi (PS) in the above debate.
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it as “illegal”,6 “in contravention of the foundations of Europe and the Republic”, and 
a “disgrace to the country [France]”,7 with the culprit being the “lack of solidarity in 
Europe”.8
1.3 Brexit
In the French debates, with the exception of the French far right (Front National) 
which celebrates it and calls for a “Fraxit”,9 Brexit is very often represented as an 
existential crisis for both France and the European integration project. As with the 
fiscal compact and the migration crisis, this is also an instance in which the future 
of the French nation and that of Europe, which is central to the understanding of 
the French national Self, is at stake, and thus requires urgent action, with France 
taking the initiative to save itself and Europe from destruction, as expressed by prime 
minister Valls in his speech to the national assembly in the aftermath of the Brexit 
referendum:
Every time the essence of Europe is at stake, France has to respond […] 
because we are France, a country which is respected, listened to, heard! 
Because we are a founding country! […] The question which France faces 
is not to leave Europe, but to re-found the European project. (Assemblée 
Nationale 2016b: 4767)10
This central role accorded to France is not contested, where the French fate is tied 
once again to the fate of the European project. Brexit is heavily perceived in the 
French discourse as a development with the potential to dilute the European project 
by triggering further disintegration. To prevent the dissolution of Europe, a “certain 
conception of Europe” which means much more than a single market, but stands for 
“social protection”, “protection of borders” and the “protection of a cultural model” 
should be defended (Hollande 2016).11 Hence a deepening of European identity is 
pushed for in the face of the threat of disintegration. There are significant differences 
among the political actors concerning the content of the policies which should inform 
such a Europe, with the left leaning strongly against neoliberalism, austerity and even 
globalisation as the main root of people’s grievances with the EU,12 and the right 
placing a strong emphasis on the protection of borders.13 Yet, almost all converge 
on the view that “more Europe” is required; Brexit can be seen as an opportunity to 
that effect and differentiation is welcome so long as France remains at its core and 
effective solutions are found: “[Europe] today is too large to allow all of its member 
6 See contributions by Brigitte Allain (EELV) in Assemblée Nationale (2016a: 2645, 2653).
7 See contributions by François Asensi (PCF) in the above debate.
8 See contributions by Phillipe Gomes (UDI) and François Asensi (PCF) in the above debate.
9 See “Brexit: les reactions politiques en France”, in Les Echos, 24 June 2016, https://www.lesechos.
fr/2016/06/brexit-les-reactions-politiques-en-france-210519.
10 See also, among others, Bruno Le Maire (LR) in the same debate.
11 See also Manuel Valls (PS) in Assemblée Nationale (2016b: 4767-4770).
12 See contributions by Bruno Le Roux (PS), Andre Chassaigne (PCF) and François De Rugy (PE) in 
the above debate.
13 See contributions by François Fillon (LR) and Laurent Wauquiez (LR) in the above debate.
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states to move forward at the same time. This is why we think that the Eurozone 
constitutes the most appropriate level of action and that France must take initiatives 
within it very quickly.”14
Even in the discourses of those who prioritise national sovereignty, subsidiarity is 
called for together with a Europe of “variable geometry” with a strong France leading 
at the core to prevent disintegration as expressed in the following: “Subsidiarity and 
variable geometry must prevail in place of the current uniformity. […] Europe is a place 
of power where the strong nations impose their rhythm on others. When France is 
weak, Europe suffers; when it is strong, it drives it.”15
1.4 PESCO
The data suggests that PESCO, as a specific modality of differentiated integration 
which was in fact originally a French-driven proposal (together with Germany), is 
widely supported by the French political elite. It is perceived as a significant response 
to the need for European “strategic autonomy”, deriving from a Gaullist vision of 
Europe sitting comfortably with the dominant narrative of French national identity 
which sets France as an important military power in the EU, yet separate from 
the US. The French Minister of Defence, Florence Parly (2018), highlights that to 
affirm its place in the world, “France has to turn to Europe”. In a report prepared and 
authorised by the Commission of European Affairs in the French National Assembly 
on European defence and its relations with NATO, it is underlined that the response to 
multiple global geopolitical challenges facing Europe – such as an assertive Russia, 
the Syrian civil war, election of Trump to the Presidency in the US and the growing 
transatlantic rift, as well as international terrorism – “has to be a European one […] 
which does not duplicate NATO, but realise[s] the conditions of European strategic 
autonomy” (Anglade and Pueyo 2018: 2). Yet, PESCO is also seen to be insufficient, 
where a “truly European defence policy” is needed (Anglade and Pueyo 2018: 22). 
This is the point at which differentiated integration in the field of defence is further 
encouraged in, for instance, building common operational capacity, and is explicitly 
contrasted with the German vision of “inclusivity” (Anglade and Pueyo 2018: 23). This 
should also be considered in the context of the potential competitive advantage that 
the French defence industry expects to enjoy in the EU market in the case of further 
(differentiated) integration in the field of defence. Hence overall, differentiation in the 
field of defence is seen as key to deepening European identity in the French case, 
where there is caution expressed with respect to the territorial/geographic limits 
of differentiation in this field, and hence the widening of European identity through 
defence initiatives such as PESCO. This is also highlighted by President Macron 
(2017), who calls explicitly for a “multi speed Europe” in defence, alongside other, 
policy matters.
14 Bruno Le Roux (PS) in the above debate. See also contributions by Philip Cordery (PS) in the 
same debate.
15 François Fillon (LR) in the above debate. See also contributions by Roger-Gerard Schwartzenberg 
(PRG) in the same debate.
  11 EU IDEA Research Papers No. 6
French national identity also figures strongly in the way in which French foreign 
policy priorities are externalised onto the proposed differentiated initiatives in this 
field such as a stronger focus on Africa and the Mediterranean, where “NATO lacks 
the experience which France possesses” (Anglade and Pueyo 2018: 34). While there 
are some objections to the policy content of the proposed initiatives, notably by the 
far left which contests external power projection,16 there is general agreement on 
the need for further differentiation for a stronger defence policy with France in the 
driving seat.
2. Germany and differentiated integration: 
Self-Identification as “good Europeans” 
and shifting views on differentiation
In the German political discourse, differentiation has gained an entirely different 
meaning in the course of the last ten years. Originally, the identity of Germany was 
tied to its identity as good Europeans who take part in all the advanced forms of 
integration, and differentiation was understood as useful tool for bypassing the 
more Eurosceptic member states. The mantra that differentiation begets more 
differentiation also meant that the increasingly different speeds of integration 
were understood as natural and not harmful. If this logic was ever challenged, it 
was only on the question of how the decisions about further differentiation should 
be reached and whether actions taken outside the framework of EU treaties were 
permissible. With the migration crisis and even more strongly with Brexit, the stress 
on differentiation was replaced with solidarity and unity as the central notions. 
German self-understanding as good Europeans suddenly meant not advancing 
the integration process as quickly as possible, without giving much attention to 
the laggards. Instead, the danger of the EU’s fragmentation and break-up became 
an oft-discussed possibility. Differentiation thus became a sensitive topic. The 
paradigmatic change was that divergence had to be replaced with convergence, 
listening and unity. As the analysis of the German discourses surrounding PESCO 
attests, even when differentiated integration takes place, it is re-interpreted as steps 
leading to more unity and the EU speaking with one voice.
As far as the three dimensions related to differentiation are concerned, i.e., widening, 
deepening and disintegration, only two come into play in Germany. It is widening that 
is entirely left out and the discussion about differentiation thus oscillates only on the 
axis from deepening to (the concerns about possible) disintegration. While originally, 
with the fiscal compact, differentiation was still seen as preferable, with the migration 
crisis and the case of Brexit the fear that disintegration might be imminent became 
the strongest factor and the extent of suitable differentiation started to be measured 
by the degree to which it contributes to or prevents the fragmentation of the EU. 
The same logic is also visible in terms of how European identity is conceived: A shift 
16 See, among others, contributions by André Chassaigne (PCF) in Assemblée Nationale (2018).
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has taken place from seeing the more deeply integrated as the true Europeans, to a 
more inclusive understanding of European identity. Differentiation thus partly loses 
its normative status and instead becomes a pragmatic tool for accommodating 
differences among EU member states.
2.1 Fiscal Compact
In the German case, the fiscal compact and the preceding crisis are strong examples 
of how identity and differentiation are linked. However, there is not one simple 
narrative that would derive the German attitude towards the fiscal compact from 
German identity. Rather, German identity is layered, with deeper elements of this 
identity shared across the political spectrum. Disagreements exist but they are 
linked to more superficial differences of how German identity should be enacted in 
each particular case.
Hence, the near consensually shared framing of the German position is based on the 
understanding that Germany is a thrifty state that always pays its debts and expects 
others to do so as well. The underlying tenor is well captured by the argument of 
State Secretary Steffen Kampeter: “More debts produce less trust and decreased 
trust only produces more problems” (Deutscher Bundestag 2012a: 18890-18892). 
This basic paradigm is almost never challenged in the German political discourse. 
Hence, any argument in favour of further differentiation (in particular in the field of 
monetary integration) has to be shaped in such a way as to make it compatible with 
this overall understanding of the German role.
However, sharp differences among political actors emerge once the question arises 
whether this German position can be imposed on other EU member states. As 
SPD’s Klaus Barthel argued, the argument about frugality (which is not doubted) 
hides a different policy, that of austerity (Deutscher Bundestag 2012b: 22242-43). 
Once austerity comes into play, the consensus about Germany’s preferred political 
course entirely disappears. Being frugal is fine as this is part of German identity; 
imposing austerity measures on others, however, is unacceptable for the opposition 
as it sharply deviates from what Germany is and what it should be. This is expressed 
succinctly in: “Madame Merkel acts as if the whole Europe spoke German” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2012b: 22242).
Monetary differentiation is thus generally conceived as the appropriate course, and 
broad agreement also exists as far as further differentiation in the field is concerned. 
As both Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Westerwelle claim, “Everybody will 
understand that the countries which are linked through a common currency, will 
also have to continue working more closely” (Merkel 2012, Traynor 2012), leading to 
a political union (Westerwelle 2012). How this can be achieved, however, depends 
on particular party-related narratives: For the right, the German identity of a thrifty 
manager, who is in a sense responsible for the EU as a whole, trumps the worry 
about excessive assertiveness; for the left, differentiated integration can successfully 
continue only if the decision to move forward is taken in the right communitarian 
way, without bypassing EU treaties as was the case with the fiscal compact.
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2.2 Migration crisis
In the German political discourse, the lesson from the Eurozone crisis was that 
differentiation is a good thing as it allows for a flexible reaction to the problems 
European integration may be facing. However, starting with the migration crisis, 
differentiation began to be treated in a more cautious manner as the worry emerged 
that differentiation may lead to fragmentation. This seemed to be confirmed by 
the subsequent development, Brexit, which thus led to a radical reassessment of 
differentiation and what it meant for German identity. Differentiation, if approached 
appropriately, could be readily accommodated within the German self-understanding 
as a thrifty manager. However, once the framing of differentiation as fragmentation 
gained the upper hand, it began to clash with an even deeper self-interpretation of 
Germany as constructively European.
Consequently, the EU ceases to be treated as an increasingly differentiated cluster of 
various member states, but instead becomes a single whole. This whole sometimes 
takes on the disguise of a “value Union”17 or a unified, economically powerful actor.18 
The narrative of the EU as a whole is further reinforced by the stress on the protection 
of EU external borders which, according to the Foreign Minister, has become the 
cornerstone of the policy (Steinmeier 2016b). In the end, differentiation is entirely 
pushed into the background. Solidarity becomes the new keyword, which is seen as 
antithetical to differentiation and to selective participation.
This turn towards solidarity is in itself more or less undisputed. What is, however, 
heavily contested is the question of whether the EU–Turkey migration statement is 
a step in the right direction. First, the question of whether Turkish President Erdoğan 
was in fact blackmailing the EU while violating human rights in the country is often 
discussed.19 Second, the question of the extent of solidarity is also often disputed in 
the German political discourse. Solidarity within does not necessarily translate into 
solidarity with the refugees or with the democratic forces in Turkey.20 To sum up, 
although the critique of the EU–Turkey statement is loud and multifaceted, solidarity 
(however defined) remains the central topos in the debates. As a consequence, 
differentiation starts to be seen as at odds with the identity of Germany as a pro-
European, constructive and refugee-welcoming country.
2.3 Brexit
As important as both the Eurozone crisis as well as the refugee crisis were for the 
reconstruction of German identity, Brexit constituted the single biggest shift in the way 
Germany perceived itself within the broader integration context. Correspondingly, for 
17 Jan Korte (Die Linke) in Deutscher Bundestag (2016a: 16735-36).
18 See Andrea Lindholz (CDU/CSU) in the above debate.
19 See Sevim Dağdelen (Die Linke) and Katrin Göring-Eckardt (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) in Deutscher 
Bundestag, (2016c).
20 See Claudia Roth (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) in the above debate.
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months Brexit dominated the German debates on the future shape of the European 
Union.
The lesson was unambiguous: Germany’s identity is European21 to such an extent that 
“the EU is deeply connected to the DNA of the post-war Germany” (Kornelius 2016). 
But this identity was shaken. Hence, the lesson is that Europe (i.e., EU 27) has to stick 
together. Focusing on the “core Europe” (Kerneuropa) would be a terrible mistake,22 
as this would drive further wedges among Europeans. As the Vice-President of the 
German Bundestag Thomas Oppermann claimed, “in the long term, Germans will be 
doing fine when Europe is doing fine. For that reason, let us fight for a better, stronger 
Europe and let us work together” (Deutscher Bundestag 2016b: 17889).
At the same time, the voices in the governing party stressed that after Brexit, Germans 
must come to terms with the fact that the EU is a conglomerate of national identities 
and those must be respected.23 Before Brexit, differentiation was understood 
normatively as enacted by the more advanced, and thus taking integration steps 
ahead of others was seen in a more positive light. After Brexit, however, this attitude 
became the target of a sharp critique. Even those arguing in favour of differentiation, 
such as Foreign Minister Steinmeier (2016a), argued that “we want to ensure that 
the others are not seen as bad Europeans just because they want to proceed more 
slowly”. Hence, the time after Brexit is not a time “to take any big gambles”, the goal 
is instead “to hold Europe together” (Steinmeier 2016a). Federal President Gauck 
(2016) went as far as claiming that this goal is so important that even “a break” 
in accelerating integration would be welcome. Similarly, when the Foreign Minister 
took part in the talks among the six founding members just two days after the 
referendum, this step was sharply criticised because of its exclusive nature, as “this 
divides Europe” instead of uniting it (Friedrich 2016).
Differentiation thus gains much more ambivalent overtones than before. Instead of 
differentiation, flexibility is broadly seen as the way forward, combined with attention 
to national and regional differences in the way the EU is understood. Differentiation 
is not any longer an instrument of the more advanced in the EU, but to the contrary, 
a way of keeping the Union together with all its differences.
2.4 PESCO
The new understanding of differentiation became a central point in the subsequent 
political framing of Permanent Structured Cooperation. Even though PESCO is a clear 
example of differentiated integration, neither the government nor the opposition drew 
sustained attention to it. In fact, the government as well as many CDU-CSU deputies 
very often directly denied the differentiated nature of PESCO, arguing instead that 
PESCO is a tool through which the EU could speak and act in a unified matter. This 
21 See Göring-Eckardt in Deutscher Bundestag (2016b).
22 See Dietmar Bartsch (Die Linke) in Deutscher Bundestag (2016b: 17886).
23 See Elisabeth Motschmann (CDU/CSU) and Christoph Bergner (CDU/CSU) in Deutscher 
Bundestag (2016d).
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was facilitated by Brexit but it was still striking how the non-participating member 
states were entirely absent from the political debates, using the argument that 25 
member states involved in PESCO was what one “could not dream of”.24
Hence, Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that PESCO will allow “Europe” to act 
decisively, “further strengthening the security and defense policy” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2018: 1078). Deputy Henning Otte saw in PESCO a better coordination 
of the EU’s external policy (Deutscher Bundestag 2017c: 239). Others, such as State 
Secretary Michael Roth, stressed explicitly that PESCO would make the European 
Union “speak with one voice in the field of external security as well as defence policies” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2017f: 339). The logical consequence of this refusal to see 
PESCO as differentiated integration was the enthusiastic talk about the expected 
emergence of a “defence union”: as FDP’s Deputy Alexander Graf Lambsdorff 
claimed, PESCO would guarantee that “common European defense projects will take 
place […] the shift towards a European defense union must succeed now” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2017e: 47).
While the reinterpretation of PESCO as a common policy of the entire EU was 
rendered possible by the British exit from the EU, the changing relation to the United 
States was even more instrumental here. Hence, German Foreign Minister Gabriel 
not only hailed PESCO as a milestone in European integration, but also argued that 
it constituted a big step towards “European independence” (German Federal Foreign 
Office 2017). Similar arguments in which the alleged European unity in external and 
security issues was posited against the insecurity of the transatlantic relations were 
also discussed in the media.25
Even the opposition did not primarily focus on the growing differentiation, and thus 
the increasing gap between the participating and non-participating member states. 
Instead, the main critique from the left side of the political spectrum (mainly Die Linke, 
but also the Greens) pointed to the danger of a militarisation of EU foreign policy 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2017b). Paradoxically, this critique shared the assumption 
that PESCO represents an overall trend in the EU, not just a process of differentiation. 
Only seldom did the critical voices mention that fact that PESCO would lead to a 
“military core Europe” that would marginalise both the non-participating member 
states as well as those who would decide to leave at a later stage (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2017a).
24 Jürgen Hardt (CDU/CSU) in Deutscher Bundestag (2017d: 255).
25 See for instance “EU-Minister beschließen militärische Zusammenarbeit”, in Zeit Online, 11 December 
2017, https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-12/verteidigungsunion-eu-aussenministertreffen-
militaerische-zusammenarbeit.
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3. Czech Republic and differentiated 
integration: Should we stay behind or go 
along?
Our study suggests that there is a significant difference in the intensity of the 
responses to the four cases of differentiated integration in the Czech Republic. The 
politicisation of and polarisation regarding differentiated integration is the most 
intense concerning the fiscal compact and to a lesser extent the migration crisis. 
Four main interrelated factors can help account for the Czech position towards 
differentiated integration. The first is related to the fact that the Czech Republic is 
a country with a deep-rooted identity-based Euroscepticism. This Euroscepticism 
is partly related to the difficult history of Czech lands and negative experience with 
“higher” political centres (Vienna during the Habsburg and Moscow during the 
communist era), and to the connected concept of “Czech smallness”. Such a national 
identity conception provides an important source of Czech Euroscepticism whereby 
EU membership is seen as a marriage of convenience, involuntary but inevitable. 
This rather general Eurosceptic approach towards European integration means, in 
particular, that the Czech are somewhat cautious about attempts to deepen (political) 
integration. A second and related factor is that integration in the field of core state 
powers (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016, Rittberger et al. 2013) is generally viewed 
with scepticism, and when differentiated integration concerns core state powers and 
national sovereignty, most, albeit not all, political actors in Czechia reject it.
The third factor is that this longstanding reserved position towards deepening of 
European (political) integration co-constituted Czech identity where the Czechs 
feel that they are perceived by the other member states as negative troublemakers 
who are blocking advancement of integration and who only know what they do not 
want but are unable to come up with a proactive, constructive vision of integration 
in particular policy fields. The final factor stems from Czech economic dependence 
on the existence of the single market. In the eyes of the less Eurosceptic actors, 
this constitutes an identity whereby the Czech Republic needs to belong among the 
“core” member states. In other words, Czechs need to demonstrate their belonging to 
the core, avoid becoming second-class members subject to decisions made by the 
core without their participation, and get rid of the ascribed identity as troublemakers 
by joining initiatives of differentiated integration.
Hence the relationship between differentiation and European identity along the three 
dimensions of deepening, dilution and widening is also not so clear-cut in the Czech 
case. Even within the one country all three dimensions of how differentiation relates to 
European identity are present. In the case of PESCO, the fiscal compact and partially 
the migration crisis, differentiation is seen as contributing to European identity. In the 
case of PESCO and the migration crisis, differentiation also showcases the limits of 
European identity. In contrast, the case of Brexit clearly shows that differentiation 
can be seen as potentially causing a dilution of European identity and leading to 
disintegration.
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In what follows, we discuss the discursive representations of each of the four 
selected cases of differentiated integration in the Czech discourse as they relate to 
narratives of national identity and visions of European integration.
3.1 Fiscal Compact
The fiscal compact26 is the most politicised initiative of differentiated integration in 
the Czech case. The debate is also clearly the most polarised one, following the 
cleavage between the clearly Eurosceptic (ODS, government and the president) and 
the less Eurosceptic, or even EU-optimist, actors (opposition, ČSSD, TOP 09). There 
are two main strands of the debate in terms of its relation towards national identity. 
The first is represented by the senior government partner, the Eurosceptic ODS and 
the then president Václav Klaus. It departs from the identity of the Czech Republic as 
a country that is proud of its currency and sceptical towards integration of core state 
powers, including in the field of monetary and fiscal policy. For this reason, the fiscal 
compact is rejected as an excessive intervention into national sovereignty in fiscal 
policy and the government therefore supports differentiated integration as a means 
to not participate. The following excerpt approximates this strand of the debate:
Thank god for flexible geometry in the EU! Do we really want to have completely 
unified EU where everything is identical and where diversity of interests, 
traditions, political opinions and historical development in individual member 
states is not taken into account? […]To be sure, the club that slowly tends to 
have 30 members cannot operate without flexible geometry, unless it wants 
to progressively transform in a degenerative way into basically a unified 
superstate. I do not want such a Europe. I want to say that the government 
of the Czech Republic under my leadership makes steps [towards fiscal 
responsibility] regardless of the existence of any intergovernmental treaty 
[fiscal compact]. We do not have to be pressured towards it by a similar 
treaty. (Czech Chamber of Deputies 2011: 552)27
The excerpt above is a common example of how fiscal compact and integration 
in core state powers are rejected based on a specific reading of Czech identity. 
The Czech government also rejected institutionalisation of the fiscal compact in 
EU law because it was afraid that it would later be made to join. At the same time, 
differentiation was supported in order for the Czech Republic to assume a position 
of cooperative actor which supports integration of “the others” while itself staying 
outside. As such, it would send a signal to the other member states that Czechia 
does not want to prevent others from moving forward and by doing so (re)constitute 
26 Under the ODS-led government, Czechia following the UK in 2012 blocked the adoption of the 
fiscal compact within the EU legal framework and later decided not to ratify the intergovernmental 
treaty. The new ČSSD-led government later decided that Czechia should ratify the compact, which 
eventually happened in late 2018. In the meantime, Czechia adopted its own “fiscal constitution” that 
basically mirrored the fiscal compact.
27 Speech by the Prime Minister Petr Nečas at the plenary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies. For 
similar arguments see, for instance: Vondra (2012, 2011), Nečas (2012), Klaus (2011).
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its identity of a constructive actor.
The other strand of the debate departs from a different perspective. Although Czech 
identity is based on scepticism towards integration in sovereignty-sensitive areas, it 
should participate in specific differentiated integration initiatives such as the fiscal 
compact in order to (re)constitute its identity as a credible, constructive partner and 
a member state belonging to the integration core, not only because of its economic 
dependence on this core. Not participating in the fiscal compact would relegate 
Czechia to a second-class member state status and cast it as a troublemaker vis-a-
vis the other member states. The following quote illustrates this strand:
Nevertheless this text [fiscal compact] in my view did not give reasons to 
state that there is a crossroads towards fiscal union and we need to stay 
away from it. It is simply part of a train journey, a journey that we are already 
members of, a train that we have already joined, thus committed ourselves 
to participate on this journey. […] We have a commitment to work on that. 
And we cannot react to the decision of a majority of member states to move 
forward by putting a spoke in a wheel. That is simply a behaviour that does 
not belong into a society that has a certain culture of demeanour. [… Our 
refusal] to participate makes us an unintelligible and obscure partner and 
creates a feeling that we simply do not trust the Union and that we envisage 
that by being aside we will not face serious consequences. (Czech Chamber 
of Deputies 2012: 648)28
In the Czech discourse on the fiscal compact, differentiation is seen as contributing 
to and preserving the European identity (deepening), at least in the first strand of 
the debate represented by the Eurosceptic ODS and former president Václav Klaus. 
The second strand of the debate does not relate to European identity much. When 
it does, it also sees differentiation as contributing to European identity with the 
main difference that Czechia should take part in this mechanism of differentiated 
integration.
3.2 Migration crisis
The migration crisis, the EU–Turkey Statement and in particular the relocation 
mechanism were among the most politicised EU issues in the Czech discourse over 
its entire membership period. However, the debate surrounding the migration crisis 
and possible differentiated integration exhibited a very low level of politicisation as 
practically all political actors were in agreement. Migration and asylum are basically 
viewed as threatening to Czech identity, culture and social cohesion due to the 
different religious and cultural backgrounds of migrants and asylum-seekers.
In the eyes of the majority, migrants and asylum-seekers should either be stopped 
from entering the EU or at least be forced to avoid the Czech Republic. Differentiation 
28 Speech of the vice chairman Lubomír Zaorálek at the plenary meeting of the Chamber of 
Deputies. Similar arguments appeared widely also in the media discourse. See, for instance: Houska 
(2012c), Sedláček (2011), Houska (2012b), Houska (2012a).
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and its relation to national and European identity is therefore less present in the 
Czech discourse on the migration crisis and the EU–Turkey statement, compared 
to the case of the fiscal compact, and externalisation of the EU’s migration policy 
is the most preferred policy option. Intra-EU solidarity expressed by burden sharing 
was also shunned for risking disunity among member states. Czechia voted against 
the temporary relocation scheme of September 2015, seeing the scheme as an 
instrument of fragmentation. Political actors used identity-based arguments on the 
incompatibility of migrants and refugees, in particular from the MENA region, with 
Czech society.
Czech identity as sceptical towards integration of core state powers, such as 
immigration and asylum policy, also played a role. To avoid fragmentation based 
on enforced relocations, political actors supported a particular kind of differentiated 
integration. This specific kind of differentiation was dubbed as flexible solidarity. 
Flexible solidarity as a form of differentiation was promoted in order to not have 
to participate in a specific initiative (the relocation scheme) while not preventing 
others from doing so, again in a bid to assume the identity of a constructive actor. 
Whereas the relocation scheme infringed on Czech sovereignty, flexible solidarity 
allowed for differentiated solidarity without compromising identity and sovereignty. 
This strategy was particularly important given that one of the debated responses of 
some western EU member states to the refusal of Czechia and others to relocate 
refugees on the basis of the relocation scheme was to create a mini-Schengen to 
which troublemakers would not be invited. This would not only clearly undermine 
Czech interests since Czechs value freedom of movement, but also the desired 
identity of Czechia as a fully fledged member state and country belonging to the 
integration core.29
Hence regarding the relationship between differentiation and European identity, 
during the migration crisis and in particular after the proposal to establish a relocation 
mechanism, it was clear that if there was no differentiation in terms of how solidarity 
can be expressed then the migration crisis would lead to a dilution of European 
identity (disintegration). At the same time, the Czech discourse also showed clear 
territorial, geographical, cultural and religious limits to European identity (widening) 
as Czechia strictly rejected hosting non-Christian immigrants and refugees, including 
through the divisive relocation mechanism.
3.3 Brexit
Brexit has attracted high visibility in the Czech discourse. The identity of the Czech 
Republic as a country presumably belonging to the integration core as well as a 
country sceptic towards integration in sovereignty-sensitive policy fields was 
directly challenged by Brexit. First, Czech actors were afraid that Brexit could lead 
to differentiation within the EU based on eurozone vs. non-eurozone lines. Secondly, 
such differentiation would produce centrifugal forces affecting the presumed Czech 
29 As argued, for instance, by the minister of foreign affairs Lubomír Zaorálek (2016). See also: 
Ehl (2016b), Marjanovič (2016), Bydžovská (2017), Kulidakis (2016a), speech by the prime minister 
Bohuslav Sobotka at the plenary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies (2016b: 529-535).
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belonging to the integration core. Czechia as a small and economically dependent 
state, however, needs to belong to the core. Hence post-Brexit differentiation and 
division in the EU was overwhelmingly rejected in the Czech debate; differentiation 
is to be allowed only if it strengthens the EU, not if it drives it apart. Integration may 
be based on more flexibility but not two-speed Europe that would create first- and 
second-class member states, as expressed in the following:30
There is a view that integration is not sustainable in the current form for 28 
member states with different political culture and history. And that it would 
need to narrow down the EU to the core, for instance based on Germany, 
France and couple others, and the periphery where Czechia would belong. 
(Marjanovič 2016)
But if the EU’s core, relieved of the insular weight, unites around the idea of 
more political integration, it would be a serious challenge for the countries 
which do not want more integration and would thus sit on the periphery. 
(Pehe 2016a)
Brexit was thus another instance of differentiation potentially causing a dilution to 
European identity by presumably creating a two-tier membership (disintegration). 
Differentiation after Brexit is only to be allowed if it contributes to European identity 
by providing flexibility while at the same time respecting needs of all member states.
3.4 PESCO
The debate surrounding PESCO exhibits similarities to the debate on Brexit. The extent 
of politicisation of PESCO was also low and so was the level of polarisation. What is 
different from the Brexit debate is that practically all actors support differentiation in 
the field of defence. Three main identity-related factors account for the across-the-
board support for differentiation in this area. The first is the Czech self-perception as 
well the alleged perception of Czechia by other member states as a reactive, or even 
destructive, troublemaker without a clear vision of what it wants to achieve in the 
EU. Against this backdrop, the support for PESCO was promoted as an instrument of 
providing a positive vision for European integration and to (re)constitute its identity 
as a first-class member state belonging to the integration core.
The second factor is related to the timing of the proposal to step up cooperation 
in defence even at the cost of using means of differentiated integration. Czechia 
never openly promoted such cooperation before the migration crisis, even though 
the Lisbon Treaty opened an avenue for enhanced cooperation in defence. As the 
migration crisis was clearly perceived as threatening Czech identity (see above) by 
undermining its cultural and religious homogeneity and social cohesion, it enabled 
open support for deeper cooperation in defence. In light of the migration crisis, 
political actors argued that the EU needs to deliver in the fields where citizens require 
30 See also, among others: Ehl (2016a), Kulidakis (2016b), Pehe (2016b), speeches by Petr Fiala, 
Jan Hamáček, Karel Fiedler and Leo Luzar at the plenary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies (2016a), 
Speeches by Bohuslav Sobotka and Milan Štěch at the plenary meeting of the Senate (2016).
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it to. Fortifying the EU against the “migration threat” by stepping up cooperation in 
defence was claimed to be the exact example of such a field where the EU should 
deliver. More effective cooperation in defence could be used to protect the EU 
external borders, to combat migrant smuggling or even to stabilise countries of 
origin of migration.
The final factor pertains to Czech scepticism towards integration of core state powers 
in fields such as defence. Politicians argued that integration in defence cannot lead 
to the creation of a common EU army or any other form of infringement of national 
sovereignty in defence. Instead, the aim of enhanced cooperation in defence needs to 
improve capabilities, capitalise on economies of scale and make defence spending 
more effective without infringing on national sovereignty. The following quotations 
are typical examples of these three factors at work in the Czech debate:31
Strengthening security and defence of the EU are crucial for the future 
development of Europe. It was the Czech Republic who started the debate 
about strengthening defence and security, together with other countries. 
The Czech Republic is heading to the core of European integration thanks 
to its active approach towards defence and security. (Sobotka quoted in 
Government Media Centre 2017)
My government managed to change the image of the Czech Republic in the 
EU vis-a-vis its partners. In the past, we were perceived as a partner with 
unintelligible opinions. We are a strong representative of Central Europe 
thanks to the pro-European policy of my government. We have a clear vision; 
we speak with a loud voice and Europe takes us seriously. (Bydžovská 2017)
The case of PESCO and differentiation in the Czech discourse is a clear case of 
differentiation contributing to and preserving European identity (deepening). By 
launching differentiation in defence, European identity will be strengthened by 
delivering what the citizens of the EU want and thus by providing the feeling of unity 
and safety. At the same time, by fortifying the EU against the “migration threat” 
through deeper cooperation in defence and security matters, the Czech discourse 
on differentiation again highlighted the territorial, geographical, cultural and religious 
limits of European identity (widening) by linking it to the defence against migration 
from the wider Middle East.
31 Other examples include: Sobotka (2017b), Kulidakis (2017), Minister of Defence Martin Stropnický 
quoted in “Evropa musí dokázat zajistit svoji bezpečnost, znělo na pražské obranné konferenci” 
[Europe must be able to ensure its security, was stated at the Prague Defence Conference], in Česká 
televize, 9 June 2017, https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/2146089-evropa-musi-dokazat-zajistit-
svoji-bezpecnost-znelo-na-prazske-obranne-konferenci; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Jakub 
Dürr quoted in Denková (2017), Bydžovská (2017), Sobotka (2017a).
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4. Turkey and differentiated integration: 
Polarised national identities and 
differentiation
In the case of Turkey, similar to the Czech case, there is a marked difference in the 
intensity of responses to the four instances of differentiated integration. While Brexit 
and the migration crisis seem to have raised substantive discussions in political 
discourses and the media, PESCO and the fiscal compact are found to garner 
relatively little attention from these circles. The analysis suggests that this could be 
attributed to two factors. One is related to the way in which PESCO, when mentioned, 
is attributed little significance in the eyes of the Turkish policy makers, given the 
continuing primacy of NATO in the collective defence of the region. The second factor 
is bound up with the idea that those initiatives like PESCO and the fiscal compact 
which primarily concern the member states and soon-to-be-member candidates are 
perceived by Turkish policy makers as of little relevance to Turkey, which is a officially 
a candidate country negotiating accession but with little credible prospect of joining 
the EU in the foreseeable future. Since Turkey is the only candidate country across our 
country cases, this suggests that candidate countries with no immediate prospects 
of membership may be more vocal on steps towards further differentiation within 
the EU when and if they perceive a short-term immediate impact from differentiation.
In the Turkish case, each instance of differentiation (with the exception of PESCO 
where there is very limited data) is overwhelmingly perceived by the government 
and the pro-government circles as a case of further disintegration within the EU, 
whereas for the main opposition, this is mainly the case for the migration crisis. 
For the Turkish main opposition, Brexit even provides a potential for the territorial/
geographic widening of the European project and identity by creating alternative 
paths to, but not excluding the prospect of, membership for a country like Turkey.
The following subsections will discuss how each selected case of differentiation has 
been discursively represented by Turkish policy makers and in the media discourse, 
in relation to national identity narratives and articulations of Europe. We find in 
particular that polarised national identities in today’s Turkey, between the pro- and 
the anti-Western camps, play a key role in the articulation of different policy positions 
concerning differentiated integration.
4.1 Fiscal Compact
Although the EU debates on the fiscal compact are rarely taken up in the Turkish 
discourse, the analysis suggests that when the issue is mentioned, it is mostly used 
to lend support to the broader national identity narrative of the governing Justice 
and Development Party (AKP), which stipulates that Turkey is superior to Europe and 
thus functions better than Europe in every policy area including the economy (see 
Aydın-Düzgit 2016), as in the following contribution from the spokesman of the AKP 
in the Turkish Parliament:
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Today, many EU member states have given up in the face of the global crisis, 
and some countries are facing bankruptcy. The future of these countries where 
social explosions are incurred and governments are replaced by technocratic 
governments, are surrounded by dark clouds…While all this is happening, 
Turkey with its economy, stability and strong leadership is standing tall. If 
you ask anyone in Europe today whether they would prefer to live in Turkey or 
in Europe, most people will probably say “Turkey”. […] The Eurozone is asking 
for IMF support. Do you see this? It was Turkey who asked for IMF support 
in the past. […] This is the state of the European Union today. Today, Europe 
is under [IMF] custody. […] We are now at a stage at which EU countries are 
losing the right to prepare their own budgets.32
The excerpt above is a standard example of how Turkey is positively represented in 
AKP discourse in relation to a negatively represented Europe/EU.33 While Turkey is 
predicated with active agency and positive evaluative attributes such as “stability” 
and “strong leadership”, Europe/EU and its member states are predicated as 
passive actors in loss of sovereignty and agency due to the “custody” of the IMF, 
“technocratic governments” and the loss of budgetary prerogatives, moving towards 
an uncertain and gloomy future as expressed through the metaphoric expression of 
“dark clouds”. Hence the Eurocrisis and the ensuing economic measures undertaken 
by the EU, including the fiscal compact, are perceived as emblematic of a diluted 
and disintegrating Europe. The binary dichotomy of Europe/EU/member states vs. 
Turkey (also referred to via the deictic “we”) is discursively reproduced over economic 
and governance standards. As can be expected, such narratives persistently exclude 
accounts on the fragility of the Turkish economy.
While this representation can be interpreted as an extension of the discursive 
construction of the Turkish national Self against the European Other in overall AKP 
discourse (Aydın-Düzgit 2016, 2018) onto the domestic debates on the Eurozone 
crisis and the fiscal compact, it needs to be highlighted that the opposition contests 
this discourse, mainly by pointing to the deficiencies of the Turkish economy.34
4.2 Migration crisis
Despite the fact that the migration crisis in the summer of 2015 ultimately led to 
the EU–Turkey migration statement, representation of the events surrounding the 
migration crisis and the ensuing statement in the discourse of the governing AKP 
have primarily rested on the articulation of Europe/EU as an essentially discriminatory 
entity as opposed the normatively superior Turkish Self, as demonstrated in the 
following excerpt from a speech delivered by President Erdoğan:
32 Contribution by Bülent Gedikli (AKP) to the Parliamentary debate held on 8 December 2011. 
Parliamentary debates were accessed at https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/tutanaklar.htm.
33 For similar examples, see also contributions by AKP members of parliament Mehmet Şimşek 
and Ali Babacan to the same debate.
34 See, for instance, contributions by Hasip Kaplan (People’s Democracy Party, HDP) and Muharrem 
İnce (Republican People’s Party, CHP) in the same debate.
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European states are panicking in the face of 150-200 thousand refugees 
knocking on their door in the last months. They are not poorer than us, they 
are much, much richer than us. Why are you panicking, why did you panic? 
They have almost been at each other’s throats, they even started discussing 
the future of the EU. […] While European states are trying to forcefully return 
and even sink ships and boats which approach their countries from the 
Mediterranean, we have saved the lives of 65 000 people at sea. […] Problems 
in Syria and Iraq will end one day, we have full faith in this. When they do, the 
only thing that will be remembered will be Turkey’s humanitarian posture and 
the shameful attitude of Western countries. We will continue supporting our 
brothers then. We come from a civilization in which those who help are the 
ensar,35 and those who seek that help are the muhacir. (Erdoğan 2015a)
In the excerpt above, Turkey is represented as a normative actor by being predicated 
with a “humanitarian posture” and as “sav[ing] lives” as opposed to Europe/EU 
negatively represented with predicates such as “shameful” and “sink[ing] ships”, 
thus killing people. Furthermore, this binary and antithetical positioning of Europe 
and Turkey is essentialised with reference to a fixed (Islamic) “civilisation” to which 
Turkey belongs and Europe does not. This is discursively made possible by drawing 
parallels with the time of Prophet Muhammed when he and the first Muslims around 
him migrated from Mecca to Medine during the early years of Islam. Hence it is 
Turkey’s essentially religious identity which sets it in opposition to Europe, which in 
other speeches by the President on this topic is also referred to as “Islamophobic”36 
and “insincere”37 by nature. The reasons for the lack of burden sharing in Europe, even 
after agreement on the migration statement, is also mainly sought in essentialist 
factors such as culture and identity which set Europe normatively apart from and 
inferior to Turkey.38
It has been argued elsewhere that one of the key national identity narratives in which 
the AKP operates and which it attempts to make hegemonic at home is the discursive 
construction of Turkey and the Turkish Self as superior to the European Other, not 
only in policy performance (as seen in the debate above on the Eurocrisis and the 
fiscal compact), but also in normative terms (Aydın-Düzgit 2016, 2018). It needs to 
be highlighted that this representation is not new, but has a long legacy in the history 
of Turkish political Islam dating back to the late Ottoman era. This representation of 
Turkish identity in relation to Europe is found to strongly infiltrate the pro-government 
discourse on the lack of burden sharing in the EU on the issue of migration and the 
externalisation of the EU’s migration policy. It can thus also be argued that the lack 
of a common European response to the migration crisis is in turn utilised by the 
35 The people of Medine who helped Muslims who migrated there during the time of Prophet 
Muhammed. Please note that “refugee” in Arabic was used to refer to those Muslims who migrated 
from Mecca to Medine during the first years of Islam.
36 Erdoğan’s interview with CNN International. See Anderson (2015).
37 Erdoğan’s speech delivered at Turkey’s Young Businessmen Confederation. See Erdoğan (2016b).
38 For similar representations in the media and political discourse, see among others Muradoğlu 
(2015), Erdoğan (2015b); Nurettin Yaşar (AKP) contribution to parliamentary debate on 23 December 
2015.
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AKP in bolstering its claim to a national identity (in relation to Europe) within Turkey. 
The fact that most of these articulations are made to a domestic audience helps to 
strengthen this argument.
While the opposition is observed to share the government’s view on the lack of burden 
sharing in the EU as well as the EU’s lack of normative values, and similarly views the 
lack of a common response as a clear case of disintegration on the part of Europe, 
its discourse differs from that of the government in two main ways. One is that it 
refrains from essentialising a normative difference between Turkey and Europe in 
their responses to the crisis, and even goes further by problematising Turkey’s own 
normativity. The second major difference is seen in the way in which the EU–Turkey 
statement is problematised by the main opposition not just for bearing the risk of 
making Turkey “one big external refugee camp” for Europe,39 but also for the downgrade 
which it represents for the EU–Turkey relationship.40 This is understandable, given 
the dominant pro-European identity which the main opposition in particular adheres 
to in its representations of Turkey and its future (Balkır and Eylemer 2016).
4.3 Brexit
Similar to the debates on migration, the political discussions on the Brexit referendum 
are also indicative of how polarised national identities in Turkey give way to different 
interpretations of a single event related to differentiated integration. The pro-
government camp in the country represents Brexit as emblematic of the EU’s failure 
and its disintegration, as expressed in the following by the current spokesman of the 
President, Fahrettin Altun:
This [the referendum] result points not at the EU’s crisis, but its exhaustion. 
Even though the Westerners in Turkey refuse to accept this, the EU project 
is at the stage of collapse. The political wave created by the far right is 
reproducing the “fear of barbarian invasion” in social and political areas. In 
this process, racism, discrimination, Islamophobia are rapidly spreading in 
today’s Europe. (Altun 2016)
Europe/EU in the excerpt above is predicated as “collapsing” and “exhausted”, and 
this vision is immediately inverted to domestic political debates with reference to 
“Westerners” indicating those in Turkey who hold pro-European/Western views and 
are often opposed to the government. Hence Brexit is utilised to lend support to 
the pro-government camp’s claim that the EU is disintegrating. The Brexit debate 
also emboldens the argument that Europe increasingly suffers from “racism”, 
“discrimination” and “Islamophobia”. Both government officials and even the main 
opposition are observed to express several times their concern with the anti-Turkey 
and the anti-migrant debates which dominated much of Brexit discussions in the 
UK.41 President Erdoğan goes one step further and ties the perceived decay of the 
39 Elif Doğan Türkmen (CHP) in the above debate, Veli Ağbaba (CHP) contribution to parliamentary 
debate on 7 January 2016.
40 See Özsoy (HDP) contribution to parliamentary debate on 5 January 2016.
41 See, among others, Toprak and Kaplan (2016), Gülsün Bilgehan (CHP) contribution to 
 26  | How Does Identity Relate to Attitudes Towards Differentiation?
EU to the increased need to find alternatives for Turkey:
I think Brexit has just come about nicely. These things can happen in other 
states in Europe. There are voices in France, from Italy. […] Here is the thing: 
Turkey should feel comfortable. It shouldn’t say that it is only the EU that 
matters to me. […] For instance I say, why shouldn’t Turkey be in the Shanghai 
Five? (Özcan 2016)
In the excerpt above and elsewhere,42 Brexit is represented positively by the President 
for furthering disintegration in the EU and paving the way for alternatives for Turkey. 
In one instance, he calls for a similar national referendum in Turkey, where the 
voters would be asked to decide on ending Turkey’s EU membership bid (Erdoğan 
2016a). Nonetheless, the data also suggests that this discourse is mostly seen in 
domestic debates, whereas in formal international meetings both Erdoğan and other 
government officials use a more neutral language or express discontent due to the 
loss of a country which officially backed Turkey’s membership.43 The fact that the anti-
European rhetoric determines mostly the domestic tone of the debate in government 
discourse can be interpreted as instrumentalisation of Brexit in countering rival and 
pro-European national identity narratives leading to expressions as in the following:
Concerning the EU, we should stick to our very own process, we need to do 
whatever our process necessitates. […] If we see opportunity in a situation 
in which Europe is dealing with its own domestic troubles and adopt an 
approach such as “let us also leave Europe”, this would only hurt us. We need 
to leave this approach.44
Adopting the membership process for Turkey is equated here with “leaving Europe”, 
which for the segments of the opposition that harbour pro-European sentiments 
is not an option for Turkey. Elsewhere, pro-European commentators from liberal/
secular camps are also found to underline the prospects that further post-Brexit 
differentiated integration may offer for EU–Turkey relations, but not as a substitute 
for full membership (see, for instance, Özalp 2016).
4.4 PESCO
As indicated above, we find very limited discussion of PESCO in the Turkish context. 
Among the policies selected for analysis in this paper, this is the one that receives 
the least attention. Where discussed, it is represented by both pro-government and 
opposition circles mostly as a weak and inconsequential EU initiative which cannot 
constitute an alternative to NATO’s role in the collective defense of Europe (Çetin 
2017, Çeviköz 2017). Both sides seem to agree however that PESCO is a clear signal 
of the growing rift between Europe and the US, with little reflection on what this may 
parliamentary debate on 28 June 2016, Anadolu Agency (2016).
42 See also, among others, Erdoğan (2016a), Çavuşoğlu (2016).
43 See, for instance, Karakuş (2016).
44 Oğuz Salıcı (CHP) contribution to parliamentary debate on 27 June 2016.
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imply for Turkey.45
Conclusion
In this paper, we attempted to unpack the relationship between national/European 
identity and attitudes towards differentiation in four selected countries (France, 
Germany, Czech Republic, Turkey) through a critical analysis of discourses produced 
in response to four select instances of differentiation (fiscal compact, migration 
crisis, Brexit, PESCO). In turn, we have also aimed to observe how the impact of 
differentiation on European identity is perceived in these given countries in terms 
of preserving European identity (deepening), the dilution of European identity 
(disintegration) and the territorial/geographic limits of European identity (widening).
We have seen that national identity representations can both enable/disable certain 
policy positions on differentiation as well as being (re)produced/enacted through 
the policy positions adopted on instances of differentiation. For instance, while the 
Czech national identity narrative as sceptical of sovereignty delegation in core state 
powers disables a favourable approach towards the fiscal compact, the Czechs 
enact their preferred self-ascribed identity of belonging to the core by adopting a 
favourable approach to initiatives such as PESCO where they do not perceive a threat 
to national sovereignty. Similarly, we observe that the Turkish government uses most 
cases of differentiation in the EU to (re)affirm the superior and anti-Western identity 
which it is trying to make hegemonic at home.
Our study has also shown that attitudes towards differentiation can differ across time 
as well as across different policy areas, where national identity can serve to delimit 
policy options available to the political elites. For instance, in the case of Germany, 
attitudes towards differentiation are observed to take a negative turn particularly 
after Brexit, where the dictates of the perception of the German Self as the “good 
Europeans” disable the articulation of favourable attitudes towards any form of 
differentiation that could potentially lead to the dissolution of the European project. 
One should also not expect a country to have a uniform position on differentiated 
integration as a whole, but that attitudes may differ depending on the policy area 
which is being subject to differentiated integration at the EU level. For instance, in the 
case of France where differentiation is generally preferred as long as the centrality 
of France is not challenged, the area of migration – which is politically sensitive and 
speaks to the core of national identity and cohesion – is where the inclusion of all 
member states under the banner of solidarity is called for.
We have also demonstrated that there is no single and monolithic national identity 
discourse within any of these national settings which would produce a uniform 
attitude towards differentiated integration regardless of the policy area in question. We 
have found instead the presence of competing domestic national identity narratives 
45 Ömer Çelik (AKP Minister for Europe) contribution to parliamentary debate on 18 December 
2017.
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with the potential to produce differing attitudes within a state on differentiated 
integration. While contesting national identities leading to starkly differing opinions 
on differentiation are less visible in the cases of France and Germany, they are 
particularly strong in settings such as the Czech Republic and especially Turkey 
where the level of identity-based polarisation is very high.
Finally, concerning the impact of differentiation on deepening, disintegration 
and widening of Europe and European identity, we have found that the perceived 
implications in each country case vary considerably depending on the policy area 
in question. While in the cases of France, Germany and the Czech Republic, the 
discussions range from deepening to disintegration with little mention of widening, 
in the Turkish case, Brexit in particular is discussed by the main opposition as a 
potential opportunity to widen Europe through leading to novel ways of external 
engagement with the EU. We have also seen that the nature of the policy area has a 
bearing on how differentiated integration is viewed to impact on European identity 
in our country cases. In cases where concrete outcomes of internal differentiation 
were reached (fiscal compact and PESCO), differentiation was generally welcome 
and viewed as a boost to European identity in three of the countries but not for 
the Turkish government, which generally represents steps towards differentiation as 
indicating weakness and disintegration in the EU. The exit of Britain from the EU, on 
the other hand, was commonly perceived as a potential step towards dilution and 
disintegration in all four cases, with the exception of the Turkish main opposition 
which saw an opportunity in it for widening to Turkey. In the case of Germany, the 
fear was strong enough to lead to a paradigmatic shift on differentiation which was 
influential in Germany’s insistence on inclusivity in the case of PESCO. Finally, the 
migration crisis where the lack of any form of formal differentiation ultimately led 
to the EU–Turkey statement was also largely feared in France and Germany for the 
prospect of disintegration that it heralded, whereas a similar view was not observed 
in the Czech discourse where differentiation was to some extent welcome and seen 
by some as an opportunity to deepen European identity by the closing of European 
borders – demonstrating once again the significance of the “national” on how 
differentiation is expected to affect the future of European integration and European 
identity.
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Differentiation has become the new normal in the European Union (EU) and one 
of the most crucial matters in defining its future. A certain degree of differentiation 
has always been part of the European integration project since its early days. The 
Eurozone and the Schengen area have further consolidated this trend into long-term 
projects of differentiated integration among EU Member States.
A number of unprecedented internal and external challenges to the EU, however, 
including the financial and economic crisis, the migration phenomenon, renewed 
geopolitical tensions and Brexit, have reinforced today the belief that more flexibility 
is needed within the complex EU machinery. A Permanent Structured Cooperation, 
for example, has been launched in the field of defence, enabling groups of willing and 
able Member States to join forces through new, flexible arrangements. Differentiation 
could offer a way forward also in many other key policy fields within the Union, where 
uniformity is undesirable or unattainable, as well as in the design of EU external action 
within an increasingly unstable global environment, offering manifold models of 
cooperation between the EU and candidate countries, potential accession countries 
and associated third countries.
EU IDEA’s key goal is to address whether, how much and what form of differentiation 
is not only compatible with, but is also conducive to a more effective, cohesive 
and democratic EU. The basic claim of the project is that differentiation is not only 
necessary to address current challenges more effectively, by making the Union more 
resilient and responsive to citizens. Differentiation is also desirable as long as such 
flexibility is compatible with the core principles of the EU’s constitutionalism and 
identity, sustainable in terms of governance, and acceptable to EU citizens, Member 
States and affected third partners.
EU Integration and Differentiation 








This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020
research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 822622
